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Drawing on the theory of sovereign risk, we show that, driven by self-
fulfilling expectations of default, both slow-moving and rollover (fast) crises
are generically possible in models with standard features, at intermediate and
high levels of debt, respectively. This is without relying on the specifica-
tion of debt auctions by Cole and Kehoe (2000). A necessary condition is that
debt tolerance thresholdsthe time- and state- contingent levels of debt above
which default becomes the preferred action by the governmentrespond en-
dogenously to shifts in investors' expectations. In a sunspot equilibrium, the
threat of belief-driven crises may not be enough for the government to delever-
age in a recession, and bring debt to default-free levels. Unless the initial debt
is close enough to the critical threshold above which the country becomes
vulnerable to such crises, the government will keep borrowing, gambling on
economic recovery in the future.
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1 Introduction
The academic and policy literature has long reflected on the possibility that countries
with relatively weak fundamentals face disruptive belief-driven runs on national
debt, raising borrowing costs and creating unsustainable debt dynamics, when not
forcing the government to default immediately on its liabilities. Different models
have been developed to lend theoretical support to such a view, emphasizing that,
once the stock of their debt is sufficiently high, the equilibrium is no longer unique.
One class of models draws on the seminal contribution by Calvo (1988), in-
spired by the persistent and unstable inflation experienced by Brazil in the 1980s,
at times of large fiscal imbalances. Multiple equilibria emerge, featuring the possi-
bility of belief driven outright default or inflationary debt debasement, as investors
price government bonds depending on their expectations of future debt paths. The
anticipation of a steep path leading to default causes interest rates to rise; higher
borrowing costs in turn accelerate debt accumulation; with a high and growing stock
of debt, default occurs as soon as the economy is hit by a sufficiently negative shock,
validating investors' pessimistic expectations. In view of this dynamic, in notable
recent work Lorenzoni and Werning (2019) dub these crises slow-moving.1 Another
class of models draw on the seminal work by Cole and Kehoe (2000), inspired by
the experience of Mexico in the mid 1990s. As the government auctions off its debt,
agents may coordinate their belief on an imminent default and decide not to partic-
ipate in the auctiona rollover crisis then forces the government to default, again
validating agents' expectations.2 Since the switch across equilibrium coincides with
a sudden loss of market access, these crises are fast. Technically, the two models
differ in a key assumption concerning the timeline along which the government sets
how much bonds to issue, and investors set their price. At a deeper level, they shed
light on different ways in which a liquidity crisis may occur.
In this paper, we show that, in addition to slow-moving debt crises, fast ones,
in the form of rollover crises, are also quite pervasive in models adopting a dynamic
Calvo (1988) setting, without necessarily relying on the assumptions spelled out
in Cole and Kehoe (2000). The reason is insightful from both a theoretical and
a practical vantage point. When the regime of investors' expectations turns from
optimistic to pessimistic, higher costs of debt either reduce the social utility of
not defaulting, or force the government to issue a high volume of risky debt and
gamble on future recoveries to avoid immediate default. In either case, the switch in
investors' expectations causes the debt tolerance threshold of the governmentthe
debt level above which default becomes the dominant action conditional on weak
1The Calvo model has also been revived by Corsetti and Dedola (2016), in the context of
an analysis of monetary backstops to government debt inspired by the launch of the Outright
Monetary Transactions programme by the European Central Bank in 2012.
2Recent contributions in this class include Bocola and Dovis (2019), Conesa and Kehoe (2017),
Bianchi and Mondragon (2018) and Corsetti et al. (2017b), among others.
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fundamentalsto fall. Depending on the initial level of debt, it is possible that
the best response of the government to deteriorating expectations does not deliver
enough adjustment for its financing need to be satisfied at any equilibrium prices.
As the market anticipates this, the government loses market access and the country
faces a debt rollover crisis.
To gain insight on the root differences between fast and slow-moving debt crises,
we set up a dynamic model where a discretionary government optimizes its fiscal
policy, deciding in each period whether to adjust primary surpluses or default. In-
tentionally, the model borrows the setting of Conesa and Kehoe (2017), except that
the timing of the auction is that of Calvo (1988)3hence the model abstracts
from rollover crises à la Cole and Kehoe (2000). For comparison, we also consider
a version of the model closer to Lorenzoni and Werning (2019), where the decision
to default is dictated by the debt limit implied by the country's natural budget
constraint, evaluated at the maximum acceptable primary surplus the economy can
deliver across time and circumstances. We will refer to the two versions as the
baseline and the debt limit model, respectively.
Our contributions to the literature build on the fact that, in either model, the
debt tolerance threshold may depend on the regime of expectations. We show that,
when debt thresholds are sensitive to expectations, depending on the initial level
of debt, crises can be slow or fast. Slow crises are possible at intermediate levels
of initial debtin the numerical example using our baseline model, for debt levels
between 59% and 121% of GDP. In this region, investors' pessimism translates into
high risk premia that in turn ignite a slow-moving debt crisis: the hike in interest
rates accelerates the dynamic of debt accumulation, and leads to default when the
economic conditions worsen or if they fail to improve early enough. Fast crises are
possible at higher levels of debtin our example, between 121% and 204%. In this
region, as investors become pessimistic, they anticipate that the government will not
be willing/able to undertake the required adjustment to sustain debt at any finite
equilibrium risky interest rates. In other words, the market comes to believe that
there is no finite bond price that satisfies the government's (re-optimized) financing
need and the pricing equilibrium conditions. When this happens, the country loses
market access and the government simultaneously defaults. In this sense, fast crises
take the form of rollover crisesanalytically different from the one conceptualized
by Cole and Kehoe (2000), but clearly appealing to the same economic logic.
We show that lengthening the maturity of government debt is not necessarily
effective in ruling out equilibrium multiplicity leading to slow-moving debt crises
these remain pervasive in both our baseline and the debt-limit model. However,
longer maturities may rule out fast rollover crises. Analytically, for the fast crises
3See the discussion in Lorenzoni and Werning (2019), Corsetti and Dedola (2016) and Ayres
et al. (2018)
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not to be an equilibrium outcome, a necessary condition is that the debt tolerance
thresholds are not sensitive to expectations: thresholds must be the same regardless
of whether investors are optimistic or pessimistic. In the debt limit scenario, this
condition is verified for a debt maturity that is not too short and probabilities of
recovery that are non-negligible. In our baseline, the parameter restrictions for
ruling out fast crises are much more stringent.
Last but not least, when an arbitrarily small probability of switching from the
good to the bad equilibrium is internalized by both investors and policymakers, the
government may have an incentive to keep debt below the relevant debt thresholds,
if necessary by deleveraging even during a recession. Different from Cole and Kehoe
(2000), however, the incentive for the policymakers to deleverage drives fiscal policy
only over a relative small range of debt levels around the debt thresholds. In a
recession, for debt levels sufficiently higher than the thresholds, the consumption
smoothing motive dominates governments optimal policy, causing deficits and debt
accumulationi.e., gambling on the recovery.
From a policy perspective, our results have key implications for debt sustainabil-
ity analysis and the design of policies to enhance sustainability. Estimates of debt
tolerance thresholds are a crucial input in assessing the extent to which a country
can steer away from default. In this paper, we stress that these thresholds are not
only contingent on the current and future state of the economy and/or preferences
of the policymakers. They are also sensitive to investors' expectations. This intro-
duces a further complication in debt sustainability analysis, hardly discussed by the
existing literature.
Moreover, our analysis clarifies that pervasive rollover risk may not be enough of
an incentive for implementing (even optimally smoothed) debt reduction strategies.
We stress that this result is obtained independently of political economy considera-
tions, with policymakers modelled as short-sighted or self-interested. In our frame-
work, even a forward-looking benevolent government will generally find it optimal to
raise debt in a recession, smoothing consumption at the cost of keeping the country
in a state of vulnerability to self-fulfilling crises. This result may strengthen the case
for an international compact, offering countries a combination of liquidity assistance
and official loans favoring economically and politically acceptable policies of delever-
aging. In both respects, our analysis contributes to ongoing policy and academic
work reconsidering the modalities and structure of official lending and assistance by
international organizations.
The literature. This paper draws on the seminal contributions by Calvo (1988)
and Conesa and Kehoe (2017), in turn related to Cole and Kehoe (2000). Calvo
(1988) introduced the feedback loop between self-fulfilling expectations and debt
burdens in a two-period model, where the government's financing need is taken as
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given, and the price and quantity of bonds are jointly determined in equilibrium.
Self-fulfilling expectations of default generate market runs that manifest them-
selves in a surge in the interest rate charged by investors to the governmentbut
no rollover crisis is modelled in the same context. Conversely, Conesa and Kehoe
(2017) focus on liquidity crises whereby the market may suddenly become unwilling
to roll over government's debt in anticipation of a default. In our paper we aim at
reconsidering the nature and dynamic of rollover criseswe do so specifying a model
on the style of Calvo (1988) model, but adopting a dynamic setting using the same
environment as Conesa and Kehoe (2017), except for the specification of auctions
underlying their view of rollover crises.
In Eaton and Gersovitz (1981), Arellano (2008) and Conesa and Kehoe (2017),
the government commits to bond issuance before the market sets bond prices. This,
together with an assumption restricting equilibrium pricing if no rollover crisis ma-
terializes, allows these authors to abstract from the multiplicity problem stressed by
Calvo (1988). Also assuming that the government preset bond issuance, Auclert and
Rognlie (2016) expand on Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and discuss conditions such
that a unique equilibrium exists. Relative to these papers, we find it reasonable that
the government adjusts its policies based on the equilibrium bond prices it observes
in the market. The government chooses bond issuance and primary deficits (the
government financing need) as a function of the (equilibrium) interest rate.
Lorenzoni and Werning (2019) reconsiders Calvo (1988) in a dynamic setting,
stressing that the increase in the sovereign's borrowing costs driven by self-fulfilling
expectations of default leads a country to accumulate debt slowly but relentlessly
over time. As the debt stock rises, at some point default occurs unless the conditions
of the economy improve sufficiently. Ayres et al. (2018) adopts a framework similar
to Arellano (2008) but for the timing assumption, to investigate the likelihood that
a country becomes vulnerable to belief-driven crises. Also drawing on Calvo (1988),
Corsetti and Dedola (2016) and Bacchetta et al. (2018) write monetary models and
discuss how the central bank can backstop government debt, i.e. eliminate self-
fulfilling crises by using, respectively, either unconventional (balance sheet) policy,
or conventional (inflation) policy.4
Several paper have been developing the model with rollover crises of Cole and
Kehoe (2000), into new directions. By way of example, Bocola and Dovis (2019)
characterize how the maturity of sovereign debt can be structured to respond to
rollover risk and fundamental risk. Aguiar et al. (2019) consider a variant of rollover
crises modelling uncertainty in social utility upon defaulting. Chamon (2007) elabo-
rates on the idea that the way in which sovereign bonds are underwritten and offered
by investment banks may guard a country against rollover crises. Rollover crises are
also modelled and discussed by Giavazzi and Pagano (1989), Alesina et al. (1992)
4See also Aguiar et al. (2013).
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and Cole and Kehoe (1996).
Finally, in writing this paper we draw extensively on previous work on debt
bailout, especially on Corsetti et al. (2017a), which introduces official lending in a
Conesa and Kehoe (2017) framework, but also on Conesa and Kehoe (2014) and
Roch and Uhlig (2018).
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model similar to Conesa
and Kehoe (2017) but with a different timing assumption. For our baseline, Sections
3 discusses equilibrium multiplicity with different type of crises, while Section 4
presents a calibrated numerical example and offer a discussion of the model equilibria
with long and short-term debt. Section 5 analyzes whether the perceived threat
of a belief-driven crisis would prevent a government from running deficits during
recessions. Section 6 reconsiders the analysis in a debt limit framework. Section 7
carries out sensitive analysis focusing on debt maturity and probabilities of recovery.
Section 8 concludes.
2 Model
In this section we specify our dynamic model of debt sustainability and default.
The environment draws on Conesa and Kehoe (2017), except that we abstract from
rollover risk envisioned by Cole and Kehoe (2000)in particular, we set the timing
of investors' and the government decisions in the style of models after Calvo (1988),
such that a government with a given financing need would not be able to set the
amount of bonds to be issued before investors set bond price.
The state of the economy in every period, s = (B, z−1, a), is (i) the level of
government debt owed to the risk neutral investors B, (ii) whether default has
occurred in the past z−1 = 0 or not z−1 = 1, (iii) whether the economy is in a
recession a = 0 or not a = 1. As in Conesa and Kehoe (2017), the country's GDP is
y(a, z) = A1−aZ1−zy¯
with A ≤ 1, and Z < 1. The parameter A denotes the business cycle: a recession
occurs when A < 1. When the government defaults, the penalty is a permanent
drop in productivity by the factor Z.
The economy starts out with a0 = 0 and z = 1. From period 1, the economy
recovers with probability p < 1 and once recovered, it never falls back to recession
again. If the government defaults, it stays at the state of default z = 0 forever.
The government issues non-contingent bonds to risk neutral investors. As is
customary in Hatchondo and Martinez (2009), we model maturity of government
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bonds as follows. The bonds have geometrically decreasing coupons: a bond issued
at t pays the sequence of coupons
κ, (1− δ)κ, (1− δ)2κ...
where δ ∈ [0, 1]. Hence, assuming risk neutral investors whose discount factor is β,




We normalize bond price by setting κ = 1−β+βδ so that default-free bond price
is β. The parameter δ indexes the maturity of debt, where δ = 0 corresponds to
the case of consol and δ = 1 corresponds to the case of short-term bond. A bond
issued at t−m is equivalent to (1− δ)m bonds issued at t. Hence, the outstanding
market bonds can be summarized by a single state variable B.
Sovereign tax revenue is θy(a, z). As in Conesa and Kehoe (2017), the tax rate
θ is constant for the government. Government spending is g. We stipulate that
there is some critical expenditure level g¯, below which the normal functioning of the
state becomes problematichence, in the preferences of the policymaker, disutility
is high. The government's budget constraint is given by
zq(B′, s)(B′ − (1− δ)B) = g + zκB − θy(a, z)
where the right hand side defines the (endogenous) Gross Financing Need (GFN)
of the government. As is well understood in the literature, timing and strategy of
issuance are the key to modelling debt sustainability. We follow the criteria in Calvo
(1988), see Figure 1.5
1. The aggregate state s = {(B, z−1, a)} is known. Each of a continuum of
measure one risk neutral investors set bond price q(b′, s).
2. The government decides to default or repay, which determines y(a, z). If it de-
faults, it stays at the state of default forever. If it repays, it chooses how much
to borrow from risk neutral investors B′ and investors purchase government
bonds. In equilibrium, B′ = b′. This determines g.
A comment is in order concerning the difference between our timing assumption
and the assumption by the literature after Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) and Cole and
Kehoe (2000). In this literature, the government sets the total issuance of bonds
at face value; investors set bond prices afterwards. In Cole and Kehoe (2000), this
5Corsetti and Dedola (2016), Ayres et al. (2018) and Lorenzoni and Werning (2019) adopt the
same timing assumption.
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Figure 1: Timing description
timing assumption acts as a selection criterion that rules out crises of the type ana-
lyzed by Calvo (1988). Implicit in this selection criterion is that, provided investors
are willing to finance the government, they offer the best price for the bonds. In
practice, a credible commitment to a specific bond issuance requires that the current
primary surplus must be adjusted enough if bond prices unexpectedly turn out to
be lower. The point of departure of our analysis is to relax this assumption, so as
to study the possibility of multiple values for the equilibrium bond prices q(b′, s) at
stage 1 in Figure 1.
In our model, before announcing total issuance, the government will know the
pricing schedule q(b′, s) on which market participants coordinate their expectations.
The price at which investors are willing to buy newly issued bonds will change with
issuance but, most importantly, will depend on investors' beliefs about government
solvency. Given the prevailing bond pricing schedule q(b′, s), the government will
adjust its fiscal decisions and issuance strategy in response to it. In line with the
arguments by Lorenzoni and Werning (2019), we find this timing assumption a
plausible working hypothesis.
2.1 Bond pricing
For tractability, we follow the literature and assume that investors are risk neutral
and discount the future using the factor β. The bond prices q(b′, s) are therefore
determined by the probability that investors assign to default in the future. Denoting
by x the linear consumption of investors, their problem is:
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W (b, s) = max
x, b′
x+ βE[W (b′, s′)]
s.t. x+ q(b′, s)b′ = w + z(B′(q(b′, s), s), s, q(b′, s))×
(κb+ q(b′, s)(b′ − (1− δ)b)),
x ≥ 0, b ≥ −A
The constraint b ≥ −A imposes the no-Ponzi condition, but A is set large enough
that the constraint never binds. By the same token, x, the linear consumption of
investors, is large enough (deep pockets assumption) to rule out corner solutions.
As in Conesa and Kehoe (2017), there are two cutoff levels of debt each period,
B¯(a) where a = 0, 1, with B¯(0) ≤ B¯(1):
1. If B ≤ B¯(0), the government does not default, independently of the business
cycle.
2. If B ≤ B¯(1), the government does not default provided the economy is not in
a recession.
For future reference, we find it insightful to dub these thresholds as the debt toler-
ance of the country.
Recall that, once the government defaults (z = 0), z stays at 0 forever. This
assumption implies that the equilibrium bond price is zero in any history with past
default:
q(b′, (B, 0, a)) = 0
If the government had not defaulted in previous periods, the first order condition
of risk neutral investors' problem implies:




B′(q(b′(s′), s′), s′), s′, q(b′(s′), s′)
)
(κ+ (1− δ)q(b′(s′), s′))
]




It is well understood that the source of equilibrium multiplicity in the model is
rooted in the possibility that multiple values of q(b′, s) solve (1).
In equilibrium, q(b′, s) is consistent with market clearing condition b′ = B′ which
implies that one possible bond price function can be




κ+ (1− δ)E[q′(·)]] if 0 ≤ B′ ≤ B¯(0)
βp if B¯(0) < B′ ≤ B¯(1)
0 if B¯(1) < B′
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in a recession and
q(B′, (B, 1, 1)) =
1 if 0 ≤ B′ ≤ B¯(1)0 if B¯(1) < B′
in normal times.
2.2 Government optimization problem
Given the bond price function q(b′, s), if the government decides not to default, it
chooses its fiscal deficit and issues b′ = B′ at the equilibrium bond price q(B′, s).
The government's problem can be reduced to choose B′, z to solve
V (s) = max u(c, g) + βE[V (s′)]
s.t. g + zκ = θy(a, z) + zq(B′, s)(B′ − (1− δ)B),
c = (1− θ)y(a, z),
z = 0 if z−1 = 0
(2)
As in Conesa and Kehoe (2017), we posit that, for any B, the following condition
holds
ug((1− θ)Ay¯, θAy¯ − κB) > ug((1− θ)y¯, θy¯ − κB)
This ensures that, in a recession, the government always has an incentive to raise
debt and gamble for redemption due to the high marginal benefit of government
spending when the economy is in a bad state.
2.2.1 Baseline
In the framework presented above, the government defaults if and only if the utility
of repaying debt Vn is smaller than the utility of defaulting Vd:
Vn < Vd
The value of defaulting is determined by assuming that, in case of debt repudiation,
the country loses market access and experiences a discrete contraction in output by
Zoutput stays at AZy¯ in a recession and Zy¯ in normal times. For tractability,
both costs are assumed to be permanent. This will define our baseline default model.
2.2.2 Debt limit
Relative to the baseline model specified above, one may envision scenarios in which
the government is averse to default, yet the prevailing conditions in the economy
and the market may undermine its ability to honour its liabilities.
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In Ghosh et al. (2013) and Lorenzoni and Werning (2019), default is decided
against a given path of maximum (contingent) primary surpluses that the govern-
ment can generate: default occurs if and only if the amount the government can
borrow from the market is not enough to finance its interest bill, given this path. In
our framework, the government defaults in a recession if and only if:
max{q(B′, s)(B′ − (1− δ)B)} < κB − (θAy¯ − g¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
max primary surplus
If the stock of initial debt is high, by borrowing, the government can smooth the
adjustment in spending and taxation required to service debt across many periods.
But given the path of maximum primary surpluses, bond prices may move against
the government to such an extent that the required adjustment in the short run
become intolerable. We will analyze this scenario in section 6.
2.3 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a value function for the government V (s, q) and policy functions
B′(s, q), z(s, q) and g(s, q), a value function for investors W (b, s), policy function
b′(b, s), and an equilibrium bond price function q(B′, s) such that
1. Given policy function z(s, q), g(s, q), V (s, q) and B′(s, q), b′(b, s) solves in-
vestors' problem at the beginning of the period and q(B′, s) is consistent with
market clearing and rational expectations.
2. V (s, q), B′(s, q), z(s, q) and g(s, q) solve government's optimization problem
in (2) given bond price function q(B′, s).
For tractability, the notion of equilibrium we consider follows a simple Markov
structure.
3 Equilibrium multiplicity and debt crises with short-
term debt
In this section, we specialize the baseline model laid out in the previous section,
in that we consider short-term debt only. The economy can be plagued by mul-
tiple equilibria: debt crises can be driven by a switch in the regime of investors'
expectations across these equilibria. Debt crises can be either fast or slow. In-
tuitively, slow-moving crises occur for intermediate levels of debt, where a switch in
expectations causes borrowing costs to rise, but the government can deliver enough
adjustment for the market to keep satisfying its financing need at the higher equi-
librium rates. Rollover crises occur at higher level of debt, because once investors
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turn pessimistic, the government may not be willing (or able as in section 6) to
contain its deficit enough to obtain financing at any finite equilibrium interest rates.
Knowing this, investors simply refuse to rollover the government debt. If and when
investors become pessimistic, they run and the government loses market access.
As discussed below, key to these results is that the government debt tolerance,
i.e., the debt default thresholds, may change with investors' expectations. If in-
vestors become pessimistic about debt sustainability, so that in equilibrium the
cost of borrowing for the government rises, the government may default at lower
level of debt, relative to equilibrium where investors are optimistic. The size of the
shift relative to the initial stock of debt determines whether the crisis is slow-moving
or fast. We should emphasize once more that the rollover crises in our model de-
velop in a different institutional framework compared to the seminal model by Cole
and Kehoe (2000).
We start by analyzing the debt tolerance thresholds in an expansion and in a
recession. Then we study and interpret the equilibrium.
3.1 Debt tolerance thresholds in normal times and recessions
In our notation, debt tolerance thresholds are contingent on the state of the economy
we write B¯(a) a = 0, 1: B¯(0) is the maximum sustainable debt level in a recession
and B¯(1) is the maximum sustainable debt level in normal times. Let Vn(B, z−1, a)
and Vd(a) denote, respectively, the government's utility if the government repays
its debt, and the government's utility of defaulting, assessed either in normal times
(a = 1) or in a recession (a = 0).
3.1.1 The debt tolerance threshold in normal times, B¯(1).
The derivation of B¯(1) is straightforward, since under our simplified assumption the
government's optimization problem is deterministic after the economy recovers (a
stays at 1 forever). In this case, without loss of generality, we can abstract from
multiplicity. If the government decides to repay existing debt, it pays (1−β)B each
period to investors to obey no-Ponzi condition. The government utility conditional
on repaying its debt is
Vn(B, 1, 1) =
u((1− θ)y¯, θy¯ − (1− β)B)
1− β




It follows that B¯(1) can be characterized by solving:
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Vn(B¯(1), 1, 1) = Vd(1)
The debt tolerance threshold B¯(1) is unique in that investors hold a unique
consistent view, that the economy will remain in normal times forever (there is no
output uncertainty any more). Fundamental risk will instead be crucial in generat-
ing multiple debt tolerance thresholds when the economy is in a recession.
3.1.2 The debt tolerance threshold(s) in a recession B¯(0).
To determine the threshold in a recession, it is useful to distinguish from the start
the possibility that investors can hold mutiple consistent beliefs that are either
pessimistic or optimistic.
Suppose investors are pessimisticin that, given the equilibrium financing need
of the government, they attribute probability one to a default in the following period
if a recession persists. In this case, investors offer a low bond price βp to the govern-
ment. While the utility of defaulting in a recession is independent of expectations:
Vd(0) =
u((1− θ)AZy¯, θAZy¯)
1− β(1− p) + β
pu((1− θ)Zy¯, θZy¯)
(1− β)(1− β + βp)
the utility of repaying debt given the low bond price (high cost of borrowing) is not.
Denoting this utility with the subscript pes, to stress that this may depend on
expectations, we have:
Vpes(B, 1, 0) = max
0 ≤ B′ ≤ B¯(1)
u(c, g) + β
( p




s.t. g +B = θAy¯ + βpB′,
c = (1− θ)Ay¯
(3)
To determine the debt threshold B¯(0)pes, we solve the equation below:
Vpes(B¯(0)pes, 1, 0) = Vd(0)
To ensure B¯(0)pes is self-fulfilling, the choice variable B
′(B¯(0)pes) in the value func-
tion (3) must be larger than B¯(0)pes.
By the same token, we can derive the debt tolerance level in an optimistic sce-
nario, B¯(0)opt. In an optimistic world, investors may presume that, given the equi-
librium financing need of the government, this will be willing and able to service
its debt even if the economy remains in a recession in the next period. Hence, we
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write the utility of repaying debt assuming that the equilibrium bond prices are
riskless: Vopt(B, 1, 0) = max{Vopt,1(B, 1, 0), Vopt,2(B, 1, 0)}. Note that we allow for
the possibility that the debt issuance capacity of the government is constrained by
a debt threshold below the one conditional on the economic recovery. In particular,
either of the following may be relevant:
Vopt,1(B, 1, 0) = max
0 ≤ B′ ≤ B¯(0)opt
u(c, g) + β
( p
1− βu((1− θ)y¯, θy¯ − (1− β)B
′)
+ (1− p)Vopt(B′, 1, 0)
)
s.t. g +B = θAy¯ + βB′,
c = (1− θ)Ay¯
Vopt,2(B, 1, 0) = max
B¯(0)opt < B
′ ≤ B¯(1)
u(c, g) + β
( p




s.t. g +B = θAy¯ + βpB′,
c = (1− θ)Ay¯
The debt threshold B¯(0)opt is again the solution of the equation below.
Vopt(B¯(0)opt, 1, 0) = Vd(0)
The algorithm for computing an equilibrium in a recession is shown in Appendix
A. To gain insight on the thresholds characterized above, in the next subsection we
rely on a simple graphical apparatus.
3.2 An intuitive graphical analysis
In the two panels of Figure 2, we draw a debt Laffer curve for our model, illustrating
the interaction between market expectations, bond issuance and vulnerability to
default in a recession one period ahead. The x axis measures bond issuance at time
0 relative to the debt tolerance threshold. The y axis measures the resources that
the government can obtain by issuing debt at the equilibrium price, qB′, relative to
the (endogenous) Gross Financing Need of the government, GFN. In the panel to
the left, the Laffer Curve is drawn as a solid blue line from the origin, which has
slope β, the risk-free bond price, as long as new issuance does not increase the stock
of debt above the threshold B¯(0)it has a flatter slope βp for a debt stock between
B¯(0) and B¯(1) due to default risk. The second panel in the figure shows that B¯(0)
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and the GFN of the government depends on the regime of expectations.6
Figure 2: Bond pricing and Laffer curves with optimistic and pessimistic investors
In Figure 2 panel 1, we depict a world where investors develop an optimistic
view. Interest rates on sovereign's borrowing remain low, which have two key ef-
fects. On the one hand, low borrowing costs make the sovereign's utility of repaying
debt higherthis translates into a higher debt tolerance threshold in a recession
(B¯(0) ↑ to B¯(0)opt). Everything else equal, more debt is sustainable. On the other
hand, cheaper debt may induce the government to relax its budget policy, hence
raise spending and cut taxes. Given the initial debt, this translate into endoge-
nously higher Gross Financing Need. A high price of bonds and a higher debt
tolerance threshold allow the government to run a larger deficit without creating de-
fault risk. As shown in Figure 2, the new issuance of bonds remains well below the
debt tolerance level. No default is expected to occur one period aheadvalidating
the optimistic expectations of investors.
Now, suppose investors develop a pessimistic view. This is shown in Figure 2
panel 2.7 In a pessimistic world, investors charge a higher interest rate on sovereign
debt at a lower level of borrowing. Hence at the risky price (q(b′, s) = βp is lower),
more debt needs to be issued against any given GFN.
As the higher borrowing costs reduce the government's utility of repaying debt,
the debt tolerance threshold in a recession will be lowlower than in the optimistic
world (B¯(0)opt > B¯(0)pes). Facing a higher cost of borrowing, nonetheless, the
government may consider containing its primary deficit, hence the GFN also falls.
However, the endogenous fall in financing need may not be sufficient to rule out
pessimistic expectations. Despite lower financing need, sovereign's debt issuance
6Throughout this subsection, we will posit that the initial debt is low enough that immediate
default is never optimal.
7Along the dotted line, investors' pessimistic belief is not self-fulfilling, and thus βp is not an
equilibrium price when B′ is low.
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B′(s, q(B′, s) = βp) surges with the costs of borrowing. As the government issues
more debt, B′ rises above the (lower) tolerance threshold B¯(0)pes. One period ahead,
unless the economy recovers, the government will default, validating investors' pes-
simism.
3.3 Equilibrium runs on debt: none, slow and fast
Having clarified the logic of belief-driven runs on debt in the previous subsection,
in what follows we shift focus on the role of the initial level of debt as driver of
the equilibrium, and allow for the possibility that default occurs immediately, in
response to a change in the regime of expectations. To do so, we will combine the
two panels in Figure 2 into a single graph, depicting both the optimistic and the
pessimistic regime of expectations together. Moreover, we will make the GFN an
endogenous function of the initial debt and the price of bonds. In each graph, we
will include debt thresholds and draw the Laffer curve.
Investors' pessimistic expectations may/may not be self-fulfilling, depending on
the initial level of government debt. This is illustrated by the three panels of Figure
3, each depicting one of three equilibria that are possible for a government initial debt
level that is, respectively, low, intermediate and high. The three panels illustrate,
respectively, a scenario of no risk of crisis, one in which slow-moving debt crises are
possible, and the third one in which rollover crises are possible.
In our model, the Laffer curves and the debt tolerance thresholds (for both the
optimistic and pessimistic scenarios) are independent of the initial debt level. Hence
they are exactly the same across the three panels of Figure 3. Different from Figure
2, the government financing needs (GFN) is plotted as a function of the level of
initial debt and different bond prices. The distance from the origin to the GFN line
is a function of the level of initial debt: the higher the stock of liabilities inherited
by the government, the larger this distance. The slope of the GFN line is negative.
To see why: moving down the line, think of each point on the GFN line as crossing a
ray from the origin (not shown), corresponding to a lower bond price q. At lower q's,
the government faces higher borrowing costs. The government has thus an incentive
to adjust its spending optimally, reducing its financing need. As discussed above,
however, this optimal adjustment falls short of reducing the new issuance of debt,
hence the GFN line is decreasing monotonically. In the panels, we also depict a new
debt threshold, labelled BN , which denotes the maximum amount of the initial debt
level in a recession below which the country is immune to pessimism.
Panel 1 of Figure 3 illustrates a case in which the initial debt stock is so low that
the equilibrium is unique and bonds are traded at default-free prices. In the panel,
the GFN intersects the debt Laffer curve in two points, at Lopt and Lpes. In the first
point, debt is issued at risk-free rate; in the second point, debt is default-risky. It
is easy to verify that the latter cannot be an equilibrium. Even if investors become
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Figure 3: Multiple equilibria and unique equilibrium with δ = 1
pessimistic, the government would still issue debt below the tolerance threshold
B¯(0)pes, since its GFN is moderate. Investors' pessimistic view would not be vali-
dated ex-post. The only self-fulfilling equilibrium is at the point Lopt, with riskless
pricing in equilibrium. In other words, in panel 1, q = βp is not the solution to
investors' first order condition (1), shown below:
q(b′, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=βp
6= βE
[ =1︷ ︸︸ ︷
z
(
B′(q(b′(s′), s′), s′)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<B¯(0)




Using this equation, we can determine at which level of debt the equilibrium is
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For initial debt levels larger than BN , if investors develop a pessimistic view on
government solvency, an equilibrium with default can be self-validating: the gov-
ernment either borrows more than B¯(0)pes, or default immediately. We now turn to
these cases, looking at panels 2 and 3.
In panel 2, the government initial debt Bmid is at intermediate level. Precisely,
Bmid is larger than BN but not too highsmaller than B¯(0)pes. Similar to panel 1,
the GFN function intersects the debt Laffer curves at point Mopt and point Mpes,
respectively. Now, both points can be an equilibrium. The economic intuition has
already been discussed in Figure 2. When investors buy newly issued sovereign
debt at the riskless price β, overall borrowing will remain below the relevant debt
tolerance threshold, B¯(0)opt, validating ex-post the investors' optimistic view. The
same logic applies to point Mpes. For both q = β and q = βp to be equilibrium
prices, the initial stock of debt must be such that the equations (6) and (7) from
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the investors' first order condition (1) are satisfied at once:
q(b′, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=β
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The type of equilibrium with belief-driven default shown in Panel 2 of Figure 3
corresponds to a scenario in which, as stressed by Lorenzoni and Werning (2019),
the debt crisis is `slow-moving'. Interest rates are high because investors expect the
government to default if the recession persists. Because of high borrowing costs, the
stock of government debt rises prior to default. But default only occurs if and only
if the country remains in a recession in the future. In our parameterization of the
model, the `slow-moving' idea boils down to a one-period delay, but this is enough
to capture the main message: the crisis is preceded by debt accumulation driven by
a surge in borrowing costs reflecting self-validating, pessimistic views by investors.
In Panel 3 of Figure 3, we show that the model admits another type of belief-
driven default in equilibrium, possible for a relatively high initial debt level, higher
than B¯(0)pes. The GFN line now intersects the Laffer curves at the point Hopt. If
investors buy government bonds at the riskless price β, despite the high stock of
initial liabilities, new debt issuance remains below the relevant threshold, B¯(0)opt.
However, if investors turn pessimistic, the hike in borrowing rates causes the govern-
ment to become much less `tolerant' of the adjustment required to service the debt.
At the point Hpes, investors anticipate that the government will not be able and/or
willing to adjust its primary needs enough to keep new issuance of debt below B¯(1)
at the default-risk bond price, and thus fast debt crises occur.
We can interpret this fast debt crisis in two ways. On the one hand, when
the market expects the government to default in a recession, the government can
issue only at risky rates. But at these rates, the government is unable to satisfy
its (adjusted) financing need by issuing debt within its maximum debt capacity
in normal timesbeyond which a default occurs with 100% probability. Even if
investors were willing to charge high but finite interest rates conditional on the
government to cut its deficit, immediate default would be the preferred option. On
the other hand, anticipating the above, the market will not be willing to finance
any government debt: the government loses market access. In a rollover crisis, the
government has no alternative but to default. The condition is given by equation
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(8) below.
q(b′, s)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= βE
[ =0︷ ︸︸ ︷
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It is important to clarify why the point Hpes in the figure is not an equilibrium.
This is shown in equation (9). Once investors turn pessimistic, the government
optimally cuts its deficit and reducing its current financing need, moving down
along the GFN line. In principle, the government could implement a further cuts in
its deficit, but this would never be optimal given that spending and utility remains
relative high after default, i.e., given that post default output remains sufficiently
high relative to the critical expenditure level g¯.
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=βp
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The Panel 3 in Figure 3 features the possibility of debt crises that we dub fast.
There is no slow-moving increase in debt levels, leading up to a crisis. Upon the
drop of the debt tolerance thresholds in response to changes in investors' views on
government solvency, a debt crisis arrives fast and early.
4 Sustainability and crises with long-term debt
For any given stock of debt, longer maturities may help sustainability, by reducing
the exposure to rollover risk and the pass through of hikes on interest rates onto
the total cost of servicing the outstanding debt. An important question is whether
and under what circumstances maturity can rule out multiplicity leading to either
slow-moving or to fast debt crises.
In this section, we show that multiplicity of equilibria remains pervasive. To do
so, we rely on a numerical example, calibrating our model with standard parameter
values.
4.1 Calibration
In solving the model with long-term debt, we posit the following functional forms
for the utility function:
u(c, g) = log(c) + γ log(g − g¯); (10)
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In our calibration, we set benchmark parameters following Conesa and Kehoe (2017).
The parameter values are shown in Table 1.
Table 1: Parameter values, baseline
y¯ Output 100
Z Cost of Default 0.95
β Discount factor 0.98
γ Relative weight of c and g in the utility function 0.20
θ Government revenue as a share of output 0.36
g¯ Level of the critial government expenditure 25
A Fraction of output during recession 0.9
p Probability of leaving the recession 0.2
δ Amortization rate of market debt 0.2
As shown in the table, we normalize output y¯ to 100 so that the units in the
model can be interpreted as percentage of GDP: e.g. B = 50 means that debt to
GDP ratio is 50% in normal times. We set cost of default as 5% = 1− Z, and this
cost of default is permanent. Our default cost is lower relative to the literature (e.g.
Alesina et al. (1992)), on the grounds that we assume this cost to be permanent.8
We assume the relative weight of government utility is 0.2; sensitivity analysis shows
that this parameter is unimportant for our result.
The severity of recession A is set at 0.9 so that a recession results in a decrease
in output by 10% for the benchmark scenario. This parameter is crucial to gener-
ating gambling for recovery in an optimistic world. A more severe recession leads
to a stronger smoothing motive for the government, which may induce the govern-
ment to choose a high-debt risky-debt strategywe report results for different A in
sensitivity analysis.
We set the critical government expenditure g¯ at 25% of GDP: the higher this
value, the smaller the room for discretionary spending. Government revenue as a
fraction of output is set by θ. In normal times, the government's income is 36, but
in a recession, it drops to 32. We posit δ = 0.2 to match average maturity from
2000-2009 for Greece, Italy and Spain, which is about 5 years. We set p = 0.2 so
that the expected waiting time for recovery is 5 years.
The key novel result from our analysis is that, since the debt tolerance threshold
in a recession moves with investors' expectations, this might result in fast debt
crises. This result holds also with long-term debt. Figure 4 plots the policy functions
conditional on a recession, together with the debt tolerance thresholds (in a recession
and in normal times), in the optimistic world (left panel) and the pessimistic world
8Upon a default, in our baseline scenario Z cannot be too small in that the government spending
cannot fall below g¯. In other words, the conditions θAZy¯ > g¯ and θZy¯ > g¯ must be satisfied.
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(the right panel).
















Figure 4: Policy functions in the optimistic world and the pessimistic world
A striking feature of the optimistic worldon the left panel of Figure 4is the
high value of the debt tolerance threshold in a recession, about 184% of the GDP
in normal times, or about 204% of GDP when a recession occurs. Notably, in our
exercises, we find that B¯(0)opt is not sensitive to the probability of recovery p or debt
maturity δ, but depends on A, as further discussed in section 7. In a recession, the
government will smooth consumption by borrowing at risk-free rate utill debt level
reaches B¯(0)opt: the figure suggests that the dynamic of debt is mildly increasing.
The right panel of Figure 4 depicts a situation in which investors unexpectedly
change their view on government solvency, from optimistic to pessimistic. While
B¯(1) is not affected, by virtue of our assumption that, after recovering, the economy
never falls back into a recession again, the consequences of such a change on the
debt tolerance threshold in a recession are stark. There is a large drop from B¯(0)opt
to B¯(0)pes.
If the initial debt is in the region between 0 and BN , the country is barely affected
by the switch in expectations. The government is still able to borrow at risk-free
rate, and, as a result, it keeps increasing the level of debt for smoothing purposes
till the stock of debt reaches BN , and then remains there, waiting for a recovery.
If the initial debt is anywhere above BN but below B¯(0)pes in a pessimistic world,
the government will pay high rates of interest and its debt will start to accumulate
at a faster pace. In the region labelled ¬ in the figure, default may then occur
depending on whether the economy fails to recover in the next period. This is the
scenario of a slow-moving crisis: a default is preceded by debt accumulation. Note
that, under our parameterization, a slow-moving crisis can arise for a debt to GDP
ratio as low as 53% of GDP in normal times (about 59% of GDP in a recession).
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If debt is in the region between B¯(0)pes and B¯(0)optthe region labelled ­ in
the figurethe crisis will be of the type that we dub fast: it will occur in response
to the shift in expectations. Observe that in the fast crisis region, as long as
investors are optimistic, the government can actually issue debt at risk-free rate.
But once investors change their view and charge high risky rates, they understand
that the sovereign will be unwilling to reduce its financing need enough to keep new
issuance below B¯(1). The debt market dries out. Facing such a rollover crisis, the
government defaults immediately. There is no slow-moving accumulation of debt.
In our calibration, fast crises can occur with a debt to GDP ratio in a recession
between about 121% and 204%.


















Figure 5: Bond prices in the optimistic and the pessimistic world
In Figure 5, we plot the price of government bonds in both the optimistic and
the pessimistic worlds, contingent on a recession. The left panel in the figure shows
that this price remains high for a wide range of debt-to-GDP ratio in the optimistic
world. The price drops very markedly in the narrow region between B¯(0)opt and
B¯(1). The right panel of Figure 5 illustrates the impact of a change in investors'
expectations, from optimistic to pessimistic. If the amount of new issuances lies
between BN and B¯(0)pes, the government may be exposed to the probability of
slow-moving debt crises next period. Thus, the bond price drops to 0.48. If it issues
above B¯(0)pes but below B¯(1), the fast debt crises may occur, which decreases the
bond price even further.
For comparison, in Figure 6 we display policy functions conditional on a recession
assuming one-period bonds (δ = 1.0). A notable result from the comparison of
this with Figure 4 is that, as δ converges to unity, B¯(0)pes is much lower, while
B¯(0)opt stays constant. This is because, when investors hold an optimistic view on
government solvency, they lend the government at risk-free rate: thus there is little
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Figure 6: Policy functions for one-period bonds, δ = 1.0
scope for maturity to make a difference. Indeed, the left panel in Figure 6 features
exactly the same dynamics as the left panel of Figure 4.
The right panel of Figure 6 instead suggests that, with short-term debt, the
region of fast crises, between B¯(0)pes and B¯(0)opt, is much wider. The rollover crises
might occur for low level of debt (above 40% of GDP in normal times). Moreover,
an increase in the region of fast crises is not fully compensated by narrowing of
the region of slow crises, as both BN and B¯(0)pes shrink when maturity is shorter.
BN falls from 53 to 5. When government bonds are all short-term, a country in
a recession might suffer a slow-moving crisis even if it has negligible outstanding
debt.
Summing up: a long debt maturity substantially improves government's welfare
by increasing debt thresholds in a pessimistic world, but it may not rule out any
types of self-fulfilling crises. Threats of both slow-moving and fast debt crises
are still pervasive with long-term debt. In section 6, we will show that the same
does not necessarily apply to the debt limit framework.
5 Does the threat of self-fulfilling crisis motivate
debt deleveraging?
So far we have carried out our analysis under the implicit assumption that, when in
an optimistic mode, investors and the government attribute zero probability to the
bad equilibrium. In this section, we relax this assumption and construct sunspot
equilibria, heavily drawing on the approach by Conesa and Kehoe (2017). Namely,
we posit that investors are initially optimistic on government solvency, but all agents
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in the economy are aware that market views may turn pessimistic with probability pi.
If this pessimistic view is self-fulfilling (in that the government borrows more than
B¯(0)pes once the switch occurs), investors remain pessimistic forever afterwards.
Debt tolerance threshold in a recession will now be denoted as B¯(0)pi. We posit a
small sunspot probability, equal to pi = 0.04.
Our key result is that, in a sunspot equilibrium, the government may choose
to decrease debt to safe levels in a recession, motivated by large gains in expected
utility from either eliminating sunspot crises altogether (we dub this the welfare
`cliff effect' of belief-driven crises), or lowering borrowing costs (the `price effect'), or
both. However, different from Cole and Kehoe (2000), deleveraging will be preferred
over debt accumulation only for a small range of debt above the threshold at which
slow-moving crises become a possibility. For a very wide range of debt levels, the
government prefers to accumulate liabilities and smooth consumption, gambling on
the prospective recovery.
Figure 7 displays the policy function (left) and the bond price function (right)
in sunspot equilibrium with long-term debt. For debt levels in the region between 0
and BN , the debt dynamics are the same as in the right panel of Figure 4, and the
government is able to issue safe debt.






Policy function with sunspot







Bond price with sunspot
Figure 7: δ = 0.2, A = 0.9, p = 0.2 with sunspot
In the region between BN and B¯(0)pi, where the economy is vulnerable to sunspot
crises, the debt dynamics are different from what we have seen so farit is no longer
uniform. This region can indeed be split into two subregions. For an initial debt
level close to BN , the government chooses to run surpluses and reduce its borrowing.
This allows the government to avoid high and increasing borrowing costs, as well as
a large utility loss if self-fulfilling pessimistic expectations materialize. However, for
a larger initial debt, the government prefers to keep borrowing. It will do so until
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its debt level reaches B¯(0)pi, even for debt levels above (but close to) B¯(0)pes, where
self-fulfilling crises, if they occur, are fast.
Why is deleveraging optimal for debt levels just above BN , but not so for debt
levels just above B¯(0)pes? The key insight is that keeping debt below B¯(0)pes shields
the country from fast crises, but not from slow-moving ones. Hence, while the
government may still have some advantage not to let debt trespass B¯(0)pes, this ad-
vantage is exclusively in terms of lower borrowing costs (as shown on the right panel
of Figure 7), not in terms of eliminating the possibility of crises `tout-court' (the
`cliff effect' is less relevant here).9 The borrowing costs advantage (about 1.4%)10 is
not enough to offset the need to smooth consumption in a recession via borrowing.
The government exposed to the risk of fast crises de facto accummulates debt faster
than slow moving one. This is shown in Appendix C.
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Bond price with sunspot
Figure 8: δ = 1.0, A = 0.9, p = 0.2 with sunspot
If government debt is short-term, the `price' and `cliff effects' play a somewhat
different role in shaping government decisions. The case of one-period bonds, with
δ = 1.0, is shown in Figure 8. Besides the fact that levels and shifts in thresholds
are now substantially different from Figure 7, there is a subtle change in the policy
function. As for the case of long-term debt, there is optimal deleveraging for a range
of debt above BN . But now we also have optimal deleveraging for a very small range
of debt just above B¯(0)pes. A key insight can be learnt from the right panel of the
graph. Note that, once debt rises above BN , investors keep lending at risk-free
rate, even if it is understood that a switch in expectations may end up igniting a
9Discountinuity in value function, like a `cliff' in a pessimistic world, motivates the government
to deleverage. See Appendix B for details.
10This is obtained by
(
1 − q(B¯(0)pes + 1)
)





use the same formula to derive yield difference of one-period bonds in our next simulation, which
is 3.4%.
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slow-moving debt crisis. There is no price effect in trespassing the threshold. The
government's deleveraging decision only reflects the prospective loss of welfare (the
`cliff effect'). Conversely, although the cliff effect is absent at the threshold B¯(0)pes,
the full pass-through of changes in market interest rates (about 3.4%) on government
borrowing costs takes only one period. The aggravation of cost is a good enough
incentive for the government to pursue some deleveraging for a stock of liabilities
just above B¯(0)pes.
6 Equilibrium multiplicity and debt crises in a debt
limit framework
In this section, we turn to economies in which the government is willing to exhaust
all possibilities of adjustment before repudiating the debt and fall in a low-output
financial autarky situation. Given the path of maximum adjustment in the primary
surplus, the default condition can be written as:
θy(a, z)− g¯ + max{q(B′, s)B′} < B
Our debt limit default framework features similar dynamics to our baseline
model. Debt tolerance thresholds may vary with investors' view on solvency, and it
affects debt paths and policy function.
6.1 Debt thresholds and crises with short term debt
In what follows, we will characterize the debt tolerance thresholds, and show how
these are pinned down by the maximum adjustment in primary surpluses the gov-
ernment is willing/able to generate. They may be shifting in response to the regime
of investors' expectations.
6.1.1 The debt tolerance threshold in normal times B¯(1).
In normal times, the government budget constraint is
B = θy¯ − g + q(B′, s)B′
Since, once the economy recovers, it never falls back to a recession again, the gov-
ernment optimization problem is deterministicin normal times, there is no reason
to borrow or lend for consumption smoothing purposes. If no default has occurred
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in the past, the government will simply service its existing debt at the risk-free rate,
paying (1− β)B to investors each period, to satisfy the no-Ponzi condition.
Given θ, the government will not default if and only if
B ≤ θy¯ − g¯
1− β = B¯(1)
where g¯ is the critical expenditure level.
6.1.2 The debt tolerance threshold in a recession B¯(0).
In a recession, the government budget constraint reflects the decline in tax revenue
due to the downturn in activity (A < 1):
B = θAy¯ − g + q(B′, s)B′
In a pessimistic world, investors are only willing to buy bonds at the low risky
price. Given the definition of the debt tolerance threshold, the maximum the gov-
ernment can borrow is capped by the stock of debt that the government can service
if the economy recovers, that is, max{q(B′, s)B′} = βpB¯(1). Now, to avoid default,
the current debt must satisfy:
B < θAy¯ − g¯ + βpB¯(1)
In other words, the government will not default if and only if
B ≤ θAy¯ − g¯ + βpB¯(1) = B¯(0)pes, (11)
an expression that gives us the current debt tolerance threshold B¯(0)pes.
In an optimistic world, the government can actually choose between two debt
issuance strategies. One consists of issuing a lot of debt, at a low, risky price
essentially this is the same strategy as described above, and is therefore associated
to the same debt threshold (11). The other one consists of keeping new issuance in
check, so to ensure that debt remains safe. This can be dubbed as a low-risk low-
debt issuance strategy. By using the same steps above, we can derive the maximum
sustainable debt conditional on the safe-debt strategy as:
B ≤ θAy¯ − g¯
1− β
Thus, B¯(0)opt can be characterized as follows:
B¯(0)opt = max
{θAy¯ − g¯
1− β , B¯(0)pes
}
26
Which strategy gives the government higher revenue in an optimistic world depends
on parameters. If all government debt is short-term, we find that B¯(0)opt > B¯(0)pes,
and thus a safe-debt strategy makes the government better off.
A notable implications is that, with short-term debt, the possible equilibria in a
debt-limit framework are similar to the ones depicted in the three panels of Figure
3. The same analysis also applies: crises can be slow-moving, for intermediate level
of debt, but can be fast, once the initial stock of debt is high enough (obviously the
thresholds will be quite different in a debt-limit framework). However, in the next
section, we will show that the crises in two frameworks may be quite different when
debt is long-term.
6.2 Sustainability and crises
To study the debt limit model numerically, we find it instructive to use a variant of
our baseline. In particular, instead of assuming (10), we posit that the government
suffers a utility cost Γ if it cuts spending below g¯, and rewrite the objective function
as follows
u(c, g) = log(c) + 1g>g¯
(
γ log(g − g¯ + ))− (1− 1g>g¯) ∗ Γ,
where 1g>g¯ is an indicator function equal to 0 if spending falls below is critical value,
and we assume an arbitrary small  to ensure that u(c, g) is bounded below when
g → g¯. This is the key implication: if the output cost of defaulting 1 − Z is large
enough to bring spending below the critical level g¯, and Γ is large enough, the value
of repaying will never be below that of defaulting. Yet, as shown below, default is
possible, depending on the initial conditions, the persistence of recessions and, as
shown below, investors' expectations.
Using this new framework, we now set Z = 0.8, θ = 0.35, g¯ = 30 such that
government spending falls below the critical level g¯ upon a default.11 For other
parameters except for maturity indicator δ, we adopt the same values as in the
baseline of Table 1. To save space, we concentrate on consistent debt paths before
the economy recovers. This is equivalent to assuming no sunspot. Sunspots are
discussed in Appendix E. We will show that, relative to our results so far, long-term
debt tends to rule out fast debt crises more easily, but remains ineffective in ruling
out slow-moving debt crises.
This result is shown in the two panels of Figure 9, which depicts policy functions
with long-term bonds (left panel) and one-period bonds (right panel). Each panel
illustrates both the optimistic and the pessimistic world.
11We observe that the initial recessionary state can be quite adverse, i.e., A can be so low that
the government cannot finance the critical level of spending g¯ without borrowing. In other words,
Aθy¯ < g¯. We discuss this case in Appendix D.
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Figure 9: Policy functions where δ = 0.2 (left) and δ = 1.0 (right)
The right panel of Figure 9 depicts the policy functions with one-period bonds.
The debt dynamics are very similar to Figure 6 but with a much lower threshold
B¯(0)opt. In an optimistic world, the government accumulates debt over time to
smooth consumption till it reaches B¯(0)opt. In a pessimistic world, the government
issues safe debt at a slow pace in the region between 0 andBN ; it starts to accumulate
risky debt at a fast pace in the region between BN and B¯(0)pes. Fast, rollover crises
can nonetheless occur for debt levels between B¯(0)pes and B¯(0)opt.
The debt dynamics shown by the left panel in Figure 9 are quite different. The
equilibrium is unique for a low level of debt (in the region between 0 and 74) and for
a high level of debt (in the region above 110). Multiplicity exists for intermediate
levels of debt (in the region between 74 and 110). With long-term debt, B¯(0)pes
coincides with B¯(0)opt: Fast debt crises are no longer possible.
With respect to fast debt crises, debt maturity is much more consequential in
the debt limit than in the baseline model. As discussed below, in our calibration,
we find that fast debt crises are ruled out in the debt-limit version of our model
for any δ below 0.57, corresponding to a debt maturity of seven quartersfor any
longer debt maturity, none and slow are the only possible outcomes in debt limit
framework. Multiplicity is not ruled out however.
7 What determines a debtor's resilience to slow and
fast self-fulfilling crises?
In this subsection we study how an economy may/may not be vulnerable to debt
crises may differ, depending on the maturity of its debt and on the nature of the
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recessionits depth and expected persistence. We first carry out some sensitivity
analysis comparing our baseline with the debt limit framework. We then focus on
conditions under which fast debt crises are ruled out in both.
7.1 Debt maturity and the persistence/depth of economic re-
cessions
For our baseline model, in Figure 10 we plot debt tolerance thresholds in a recession
as we vary debt maturity (left panel) and the probability of recovery (right panel).












Figure 10: Debt thresholds in the baseline model given A = 0.9
Starting from the the left panel of Figure 10, we first note that, in an optimistic
world, B¯(0)opt is insensitive to debt maturity, but for extremely small values of
δ (δ → 0) corresponding to very long maturities. As long as investors remain
optimistic, the government can borrow at risk-free rate. Long-term debt and short-
term debt are basically equivalenta small effect can be detected only at extreme
maturities, reflecting a lower incidence of debt rollover on the gross financing need.
In contrast, both BN and B¯(0)pes decrease sharply with δ, that is, they increase
with a longer debt maturity of debt. To see why, consider the net bond revenue
in a pessimistic world, βp(B′ − (1 − δ)B) − κB, where βpB′, βp(1 − δ)B and κB
denote, respectively, revenue from newly issued bonds, the value of the outstanding
stock of bonds, and interest payment to investors. Maturity has two opposite effects
on net bond revenue. As the maturity of bonds becomes longer (δ ↓), the value
of the outstanding stock of bonds βp(1 − δ)B rises but the interest payments due
in the period κB fall. The first effect decreases, the second effect increases the
net bond revenue. But now rearrange the net bond revenue equation, as follows:
βpB′− [1−β(1−p)(1−δ)]B. It is apparent that the second effect always dominates
the first one: a fall in δ unambiguously increases net debt revenueexplaining why
B¯(0)pes and BN are larger as the debt maturity becomes longer. One could note
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that, when investors hold a pessimistic view of the government, an official swap of
short-term bonds for long-term bonds may improve the debt tolerance threshold of
a country (a point discussed is detailed in Corsetti et al. (2017a)).
In Figure 10, observe that the fast crisis zone, the distance between B¯(0)opt and
B¯(0)pes, becomes wider, the shorter debt maturity is. On the contrary, the slow-
moving crisis zone, the distance between BN and B¯(0)pes, remains approximately
unchanged as maturity shortensBN as well as B¯(0)pes basically falls at a similar
pace.
Mirroring these results, the right panel of Figure 10 shows that the probability
of recovery p does not have much of an effect on B¯(0)opt, while it has a significant
impact on both BN and B¯(0)pes. Using once again the expression for the net bond
revenue in a pessimistic world, βp(B′ − (1 − δ)B) − κB, we can see that this is
unambiguously increasing in p. By contrast, the net bond revenue in an optimistic
world, β(B′−(1−δ)B)−κB, does not vary with p. Observe that a higher probability
of recovery p significantly narrows the fast crisis zone. It also narrows, but to a
lesser extent, the slow-moving crisis zone.
We repeat this sensitivity analysis for the debt limit frameworkresults are
shown in Figure 11. There is at least one significant difference relative to our base-
line. Focusing on the the left panel in Figure 11, note that the debt threshold B¯(0)opt
is insensitive to debt maturity only for a δ higher than 0.57, that is, for relatively
short maturities. With short-term debt, a low-debt safe-debt issuance strategy yields
higher revenue than high-debt risky-debt issuance strategyit is rationale for the
government to remain on the good side of the Laffer curve. As explained in our
comments to the previous figure, intuitively, the revenue from a low-risk issuance
strategy is not affected by δ because investors lend at risk-free rate. However, once
δ becomes smaller than 0.57, i.e., once debt maturity becomes sufficiently long, the
government rationally switches to a high debt, risky-debt issuance strategy even
in the optimistic world. Different from the left panel of Figure 10, B¯(0)opt is now
the same as B¯(0)pes, both increasing in debt maturity (lower δ). The remarkable
implication is that, with longer maturities, the fast crises zone no longer exists.
A similar picture is provided by the right panel of Figure 11, which plots debt
thresholds against the probability of recovery p. Different from the corresponding
panel in Figure 10, B¯(0)opt now rises substantially with larger p, and coincides with
B¯(0)pes for any p larger than 0.08. Only for a very low probability of recovery, the
low-debt safe-debt issuance strategy dominates the high-debt risky-debt issuance
strategy in the optimistic world, causing B¯(0)opt to diverge from B¯(0)pes, and to
remain insensitive to p. For any non-negligible probability of recovery (p larger
than 0.08), risky-debt strategy generates higher revenue and the fast crises zone
disappears.
Overall, our sensitivity analysis confirms a striking difference between the base-
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Figure 11: Debt thresholds in the debt limit framework given A = 0.9
line model and the debt limit framework. For a mildly long debt maturity and
non-negligible probability of recovery, fast (rollover) crises are still possible in the
former, but not in the latter. The reason is that in a debt limit framework, the
government takes advantage of long debt maturities and good recovery prospect to
smooth consumption issuing risky debt (de facto putting the economy in a slow-
moving debt crisis mode) even when investors have optimistic expectations.
7.2 Ruling out fast debt crises
In the sensitivity analysis carried out above, we were unable to rule out fast debt
crises in our baseline model. However, logically, it must be possible that fast debt
crises also disappear in this frameworkin circumstances in which the government
has a strong incentive to pursue high-debt risky-debt issuance strategy even when
investors' expectations are optimistic. We now show that this may be the case if
the country is in a very deep recession (A is very low), the probability of recovery
is quite high, and debt maturity is sufficiently long, as to mute the pass-through of
high interest rates on the total cost of debt servicing. The case is shown in Figure
12.
In Figure 12 we set A = 0.8 and p = 0.6: the current recession is exceptionally
deep (with a loss of output equal to 20%), but the likelihood of exiting from in a
period is larger than 50%. Figure 12 shows policy functions when debt is long-term
(δ = 0.2) in the left panel, and when debt is short (δ = 1.0) in the right panel.
When government bonds are only short-term, we confirm the results in the pre-
vious subsection. On the right panel of Figure 12, B¯(0)opt does not coincide with
B¯(0)pes, and thus fast debt crises are possible. It is worth reiterating the reason.
Despite the depth of the recession and the good prospects for a recovery, due to the
short debt maturity (high δ), the government is de facto financially constraineda
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Figure 12: Policy functions in a very severe recession and high probability of
recovery, A = 0.8 and p = 0.6, where δ = 0.2 (left) and δ = 1.0 (right)
risky issuance strategy would quickly raise its interest costs. In an optimistic world,
the government has no incentive to gamble: it will stick to a low-debt safe-debt
issuance strategy.
The picture is quite different on the left panel of Figure 12. As long as debt
maturity is sufficiently long, in the optimistic world, a very severe recession makes
borrowing very attractive for consumption smoothing motive. Because the probabil-
ity of recovery is high and there is no need to roll over debt fully every period, below
B¯(0)opt the government keeps accumulating debt. If, unfortunately, the recession
lasts many periods, the government ends up gambling for recovery.
Strikingly, the government is more conservative in a pessimistic world. For any
debt level below BN , the government slowly accumulates debt till it reaches BN .
Given that investors are pessimistic, the government finds it too expensive to smooth
above BN , as the interest rate would surge abruptlya jump which would not occur
in the optimistic world. In the region between BN and B¯(0)pes, the government
gambles on the recovery.
8 Conclusion
Are countries vulnerable to belief-driven sovereign debt crises? Leading answers in
the literature emphasize that, once the stock of their debt is sufficiently high, the
equilibrium is no longer unique. According to one approach, at any point in time a
switch in market expectations from a good to a bad equilibrium may result in higher
borrowing costs causing debt accumulationthe crisis then develops slowly, from
a combination of an unsustainable build-up of debt and fundamental stress, as in
32
Calvo (1988) and Lorenzoni and Werning (2019). According to another approach,
the switch causes a country to lose market access: a rollover crisis forces a sudden
default, as in Cole and Kehoe (2000).
In this paper, we have shown both crises may occur in a dynamic Calvo (1988)
setting. When the regime of investors' expectations turns from optimistic to pes-
simistic, higher costs of debt either reduce the social utility of not defaulting, or
force the government to issue a high volume of risky debt and gamble on future
recoveries. In either case, the debt tolerance threshold of the governmentthe debt
level above which default becomes the dominant actionfalls with the switch in
investors' expectations. At this switch, depending on the initial level of debt, in-
vestors may anticipate that the government will not be willing/able to undertake
the required adjustment to sustain debt at any finite equilibrium interest rates. At
sufficiently high levels of debt, countries able to borrow at the risk-free rate may
suddenly lose market access and, in the absence of external official support, default.
By characterizing a sunspot equilibrium, we are able to revisit debt dynamics
and deleveraging under the threat of a rollover crisis. As in the existing literature,
we find that a forward-looking benevolent government to reduce debt even during
recessions, motivated by the prospective loss of welfare in a belief-driven crisis and
high costs of borrowing. Different from the existing literature, however, in our new
framework deleveraging is optimal only for a relatively small range of debt close
to the debt threshold at which the country becomes exposed to slow-moving debt
crisis. On the contrary, deleveraging is not generally optimal around the higher
debt threshold at which the country becomes exposed to fast, rollover crises. Our
results suggest the threat of a belief-driven debt run will not be generally effective
in leading forward-looking benevolent governments to embrace precautionary fiscal
policy of risk reduction.
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A The algorithm for computing value function in a
recession
A.1 Baseline
The algorithm computes two debt thresholds in an optimistic world, and three debt
thresholds in a pessimistic world.
A.1.1 Optimistic
1. Compute the debt tolerance threshold in normal times B¯(1) by solving the
equation below
u((1− θ)y¯, θy¯ − (1− β)B¯(1))
1− β = Vd(1)
After the economy recovers, the government's optimization problem is deter-
ministic. Thus, the value function in normal times can be characterized by
V (B, a = 1) =

u((1−θ)y¯,θy¯−(1−β)B)
1−β if 0 ≤ B ≤ B¯(1)
Vd(1) if B¯(1) < B
2. Guess initial values for threshold B¯(0)opt and the bond price function q˜opt(B
′, 0)
in a recession.
3. Given the bond price function q˜opt(B
′, 0) and B¯(0)opt, guess value function
V˜ (B, 0) in an optimistic world. Perform value function iteration and update
initial guess until it satisfies convergence criterion max
B
∣∣V (B, 0)−V˜ (B, 0)∣∣ < .
V (B, a = 0) = max{Vopt,1(B, 0), Vopt,2(B, 0), Vd(0)}, where
Vopt,1(B, 0) = max
0 ≤ B′ ≤ B¯(0)opt
u(c, g) + β
(
pV (B′, 1) + (1− p)V˜ (B′, 0)
)
s.t. g + κB = θAy¯ + q˜opt(B
′, 0)
(
B′ − (1− δ)B),
c = (1− θ)Ay¯
Vopt,2(B, 0) = max
B¯(0)opt < B
′ ≤ B¯(1)
u(c, g) + β
(
pV (B′, 1) + (1− p)Vd(0)
)
s.t. g + κB = θAy¯ + βp(B′ − (1− δ)B),
c = (1− θ)Ay¯
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4. Derive a new value of B¯(0)opt by solving equation below
V (B¯(0)opt,new, 0) = Vd(0)








p+ (1− p)(κ+ (1− δ)q˜opt(B′(B′, 0), 0))) if 0 ≤ B′ ≤ B¯(0)opt
βp if B¯(0)opt < B
′ ≤ B¯(1)
0 if B¯(1) < B′
6. If max
B′
∣∣q˜opt(B′, 0) − qopt(B′, 0)∣∣ >  or/and ∣∣B¯(0)opt − B¯(0)opt,new∣∣ > , then
q˜opt(B
′, 0) = qopt(B′, 0) and B¯(0)opt = B¯(0)opt,new, and go back to 3. Otherwise,
we finish deriving B¯(0)opt, qopt(B
′, 0), and V (B, 0) in an optimistic world.
A.1.2 Pessimistic
1. Repeat A.1.1 step 1.
2. Compute the government's utility and policy function given bond price q(B′, 0) =
βp, denoted as Vpes(B, 0) and B
′
pes(B, 0), respectively.
Vpes(B, 0) = max
0 ≤ B′ ≤ B¯(1)
u(c, g) + β
(
pV (B, 1) + (1− p)Vd(0)
)
s.t. g + κB = θAy¯ + βp(B′ − (1− δ)B),
c = (1− θ)Ay¯
3. Derive B¯(0)pes by solving equation below.
Vpes(B¯(0)pes, 0) = Vd(0)
Check whether B′pes(B¯(0)pes, 0) > B¯(0)pes. If not, pessimistic expectations
are not self-fulfilling. Note that, different from B¯(0)opt, we can derive B¯(0)pes
without guessing.
4. Derive BN by solving equation below.
BN = sup
B
{B′pes(B, 0) ≤ B¯(0)pes}
5. Guess the bond price function q˜pes(B
′, 0) in a recession.
37
6. Given the bond price function q˜pes(B
′, 0), guess value function in a pessimistic
world V˜ (B, 0). Perform value function iteration and update initial guess until
it satisfies convergence criterion max
B
∣∣V (B, 0)− V˜ (B, 0)∣∣ < .




Vsafe(B, 0), Vpes(B, 0), Vd(0)
}
if 0 ≤ B ≤ BN
Vpes(B, 0) if BN < B ≤ B¯(0)pes
Vd(0) if B¯(0)pes < B
where
Vsafe(B, 0) = max
0 ≤ B′ ≤ BN
u(c, g) + β
(
pV (B′, 1) + (1− p)V˜ (B′, 0)
)
s.t. g + κB = θAy¯ + q˜pes(B
′, 0)
(
B′ − (1− δ)B),
c = (1− θ)Ay¯








p+ (1− p)(κ+ (1− δ)q˜pes(B′(B′, 0), 0))) if 0 ≤ B′ ≤ BN
β
(
p+ (1− p)(κ+ (1− δ)βp)) if BN < B′ ≤ B¯(0)pes
βp if B¯(0)pes < B
′ ≤ B¯(1)
0 if B¯(1) < B′
8. If max
B′
∣∣q˜pes(B′, 0) − qpes(B′, 0)∣∣ > , then q˜pes(B′, 0) = qpes(B′, 0), and go













θAy¯ − g¯ + βpB¯(1)
1− β(1− p)(1− δ)
}
3. REWRITE The methodology of deriving the government's policy choice and
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bond price function is similar to the baseline framework. The main difference
here is that debt thresholds are already given, and the utility of every finite
grid point must be larger than the utility of defaulting. For instance, we
can simply set Vd(0) = −99999999 such that it is never optimal to default
strategically in a simulation.
A.2.2 Pessimistic
1. Repeat A.2.1 step 1.
2. Derive the debt threshold in a recession.
B¯(0)pes =
θAy¯ − g¯ + βpB¯(1)
1− β(1− p)(1− δ)
3. Set Vd(0) = −99999999 and use the debt thresholds we derived at stage 1 and
2 to solve the equilibrium.
B The `Cliff effect' in welfare due to self-fulfilling
crises
Figure 13 depicts the government's value function in a pessimistic world for δ = 0.2.
We dub `cliff' the discontinuity in the value function at the debt threshold. A cliff
is apparent at BN . At this threshold, the possibility of self-fulfilling crises due to
pessimistic expectations causes utility to deteriorate by a significant amount. In a
sunspot equilibrium, this loss of utility may motivate the government to deleverage
and keep debt below BN . Note that, however, there is no cliff around the other
threshold - a significant utility incentive for the government to deleverage only exists
around BN .






Figure 13: Cliff effect (δ = 0.2)
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C Debt evolution in baseline sunspot equilibria
Figure 14 displays debt path starting from B = 75 in sunspot equlibria. The gov-
ernment accumulates debt over time as long as the sunspot event does not occur.
Debt accumulation is slower when debt level is below B¯(0)pes, whereas it accelerates
after sovereign debt enters fast crises zone, above B¯(0)pes.






Debt path with sunspot
long-term debt
Figure 14: Debt path starting from B = 75
D Deep recessions in a debt limit framework
In a deep recession, the government may only be able to sustain g¯ via borrowing. In
other words, g¯ > θAy¯. This case is shown in Figure 15 where A = 0.8. The figure
shows the path of optimal debt accumulation over time, contrasting the economy
with long-term bonds (left) and one-period bonds (right). The initial debt level is
set to 0 in both panels. In either case, the government keeps increasing its debt
towards unsustainable levels (depending on the persistence of recession) until the
economy recovers.




Debt paths of long-term debt




Debt paths of short-term debt
Figure 15: Deep recession A = 0.8
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Note that the government accumulates debt faster, and defaults earlier, in a pes-
simistic world. Comparing the two panels also shows that, when debt is short-term,
the debt tolerance threshold in a recession B¯(0) is lower and thus the government
ends up gambling on the recovery earlier.
E Sunspot equilibria in a Debt Limit framework
In a debt limit framework, a sunspot equilibrium modifies our previous analysis in
two respects. First, when government bonds are long-term, at intermediate level of
debt, there is an acceleration of debt accumulation. Second, when debt is short-term,
debt thresholds become sensitive to the probability attributed to the sunspotthey
shift at low values of these probabilities.
In Figure 16, we display the bond price function and debt accumulation in the
time domain for two different levels of debt in our economy with long-term bonds.
Each panel illustrates both the optimistic equilibrium and the sunspot equilibrium.
We omit the policy function from the graph because this is visually very close to an








Bond price with sunspot







Debt paths for intermediate debt level







Debt paths for high debt level
Figure 16: Policy function and bond price function (δ = 0.2)
The center and right panels of Figure 16 clarify the main difference between
the optimistic and the sunspot equilibria. In both panels, default may occur with
positive probability, but the center panel starts from a moderate debt level (B = 76),
while the right panel start from a high debt level (B = 110).
The sunspot equilibrium makes a difference only for the case in the center panel
of Figure 16: the government accumulates debt faster in a sunspot world. When the
economy is exposed to sunspot crises, the government has to pay higher spread at
intermediate level of debt. This accelerates debt accumulation: as debt crises arrive
earlier, the spread rises even further, larger than pi = 4% for B′ close to BN in the
left panel of Figure 16.
When debt is high enough, pricing in the sunspot equilibrium is less crucial. The
right panel of Figure 16 shows that the debt paths are identical in both the sunspot
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and optimistic equilibria. Intuitively, investors may turn pessimistic at T = 1, but
the government always chooses risky-debt high-debt issuance strategy at T = 1
regardless of investors' belief (multiplicity does not exist for high debt levels, see
Figure 9). As a result, the sunspot is immaterial for the equilibrium.
The economy with one-period debt features different debt dynamics. Strikingly,
B¯(0)pi coincides with B¯(0)pes: in the sunspot equilibrium, the debt tolerance thresh-
old shrinks towards B¯(0)pes with one-period debt. We find that for any pi above 1%
(consistent with the policy function), the government always issues default-free debt
up to B¯(0)pes.
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